Introduction
Relativity: The Special and General Theory by Albert Einstein presents foundational concepts in physics, addressing the nature of space, time, and geometry. The text explores the logical structure of geometry, the role of axioms, and the distinction between mathematical truth and physical reality, providing a detailed examination of both Euclidean and non-Euclidean geometrical frameworks within the theory of relativity.
Book Information
- Title : Relativity The Special And General Theory
- Author : Albert Einstein
- Original language : German
- Publication date : 1916
- Genre : Popular science
- Format : PDF
- Pages : 175
About Relativity The Special And General Theory
Albert Einstein’s popular exposition introduces special and general relativity for readers without advanced mathematical training. Beginning with questions about geometry, measurement, and the meaning of simultaneity, he explains how observations of space and time depend on the motion of the observer. The discussion develops the special theory through reference frames, the constancy of light’s velocity, and the Lorentz transformation, then turns to acceleration, gravitation, and curved spacetime in the general theory. Thought experiments involving trains, clocks, rods, elevators, and rotating systems make abstract principles more concrete. First published in German in 1916, the book is notable as Einstein’s own accessible account of ideas that transformed modern physics.
Why Read Relativity The Special And General Theory?
Reading Einstein’s own explanation reveals not only the conclusions of relativity but also the reasoning behind them. His carefully staged thought experiments show how familiar assumptions about absolute time, fixed space, motion, and gravity can be questioned through precise definitions and logical argument. The book also clarifies the relationship between mathematical geometry and physical reality, making it valuable to readers interested in the philosophy and history of science as well as physics. Although some passages require patience and later terminology may differ from modern textbooks, the work offers direct insight into one of the twentieth century’s most important scientific theories and the conceptual problems that shaped it.
Excerpt from the Book
your schooldays most of you who read this book made acquaintance with the noble building of Euclid’s geometry, and you remember— perhaps with more respect than love — the magnificent structure, on the lofty staircase of which you were chased about for uncounted hours by conscientious teachers. By reason of your past experience, you would certainly regard every one with disdain who should pronounce even the most out-of-the-way proposition of this science to be untrue. But perhaps this feeling of proud certainty would leave you immediately if some one were to ask you: “What, then, do you mean by the assertion that these propositions are true?” Let us proceed to give this question a little consideration.
Geometry sets out from certain conceptions such as “plane,” “point,” and “straight line,” with which we are able to associate more or less definite ideas, and from certain simple propositions (axioms) which, in virtue of these ideas, we are inclined to accept as “true.” Then, on the basis of a logical process, the justification of which we feel ourselves compelled to admit, all remaining propositions are shown to follow from those axioms, i.e. they are proven. A proposition is then correct (“true”) when it has been derived in the recognised manner from the axioms. The question of the “truth” of the individual geometrical propositions is thus reduced to one of the “truth” of the axioms. Now it has long been known that the last question is not only unanswerable by the methods of geometry, but that it is in itself entirely without meaning. We cannot ask whether it is true that only one straight line goes through two points. We can only say that Euclidean geometry deals with things called “straight lines,” to each of which is ascribed the property of being uniquely determined by two points situated on it.
The concept “true” does not tally with the assertions of pure geometry, because by the word “true” we are eventually in the habit of designating always the correspondence with a “real” object; geometry, however, is not concerned with the relation of the ideas involved in it to objects of experience, but only with the logical connection of these ideas among themselves.